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Abstract

transformation that occurred in the late 1980s with a
shift from managing technology to technology’s impact on management. We are proposing that the focus
of MIS research in information economics needs to
shift away from the impact of innovative uses of information on the firm, and now needs to focus more
on the impact of innovative uses of information on
society. Research in information economics will need
to broaden beyond economics, economic modeling,
and econometric analysis of performance that focus on
information technology’s implications for business
strategy, and will need to address critical problems in
social welfare, social policy, regulation, and the law.
McFarlan proposed that we study how information and information systems changed management, changed strategy, and changed business [43].
His work at this time advocated that the teaching of
Management Information Systems needed to be transformed from the Management of Information Systems
and the management of information technology hardware and software, to the impact of Information Systems on Management and the management of organizations in the presence of information. He proposed
that academic research would need to shift in order to
enable this new focus in teaching.
The field rapidly responded and rapidly embraced
the transformation. A quick review of the actions that
followed quickly thereafter will be helpful. In 1986
Yannis Bakos and Michael Treacy published their
work on the new reference disciplines underlying academic research in management information systems
[2]. The response broadened when Clemons launched
his mini-track on Information, Telecommunications,
and Strategy at HICSS in 1988 (See, for example, [15,
16] and when the Journal of Management Information
Systems began to publish a special issue on the best
research from that mini-track in 1989 (see, for example [16, 17]). The transformation of the field and the
acceptance of its new focus became mainstream when
Yannis Bakos and Chris Kemerer held the first Workshop on Information Systems and Economics in Cambridge in 1989 (See conference website
[http://misrc.umn.edu/wise/previous_years2016.html].
Bakos and Treacy [2] began to formalize the references disciplines that underlie online strategy, going
beyond McFarlan’s embracing of Porter to solidify the
links with economics and information economics.
Clemons searched for the intersection between economic theory and empirical observation, and his
HICSS colleagues began publishing refereed case

The academic research community is going to augment its research and teaching focus once again,
comparable to the change in the 1980s when studying
management of information was augmented with studying the impact of information on management. Just
as information economics became newly significant
for research and teaching in business school’s MBA
programs, there will be an increasing focus on the
impact of information on society and social welfare.
The study of strategy will be augmented by the strategy of social policy, regulation, and the law. This will
allow us to exploit our competitive advantage over
researchers in large technology firms, which enjoy
greater access to data, computing, and analytical
staff. This will also make us more valuable to our students and to society.
1.

Introduction

We suggest that the future of academic information
systems research, and especially research as it will be
conducted at major business schools, is going to be
transformed over the coming decade. Thirty years ago
business school MIS research augmented its traditional study of database management and other emerging
areas of technology, and its study of software development, software implementation and adoption, and
technology management, and began to include work at
the intersection of information economics and information-based strategy. As firms like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and others make breakthrough
advances in information-based strategy, academic
business school researchers in information-based
strategy may find it harder to compete directly with
them. We believe that the emerging focus of business
school research in information systems economics is
going to be at the intersection of disciplines like information-based business models, the societal impacts
of business and technological innovation, social welfare, regulatory policy, and the law. In addition to
allowing information systems economics faculty to
work in an area where they can exploit a competitive
advantage, this work will be of great value to our students as they assume leadership positions, to corporations that need to understand the future of regulation
in order to plan, and to society more broadly.
We are advocating an augmentation of research
focus, methodology, and reference disciplines in the
MIS research community, one as profound as the
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studies that explored theory [15, 16], modeling that
extended and formalized theory [17, 20, 21], ethnographic and anthropological studies [38, 39], and more
quantitative econometric and empirical studies that
solidified our belief in theory [19, 34]. Bakos and
Kemerer’s WISE succeeded in bringing in a broad
community of faculty interested in economic modeling of information-based strategies and online business models.
We suggest that for a variety of reasons research
in information systems economics will need to address
the future social and societal impacts of the deployment of online technology and online business models. This research needs to address understanding the
distribution of future benefits and the potential for
future harm. This is not divorced from the MIS community’s current focus on information economics and
strategy, but rather is deeply linked to it. We now
have a far better idea of how firms can exploit information and online business models for strategic advantage, and when that advantage may indeed be unassailable and beyond competitive pressures. We do
not yet know how to harness those strategies to maximize social welfare or how to distribute social welfare in a way that is in some sense equitable.
The advantages to our academic community from
this shift of focus are clear. In the 1980s we claimed
for ourselves and our Ph.D. students an area that was
of great importance to business and to MBA students,
and that was not yet fully embraced by computer science, business strategy, or economics. Once again, we
have the opportunity to claim an area that is of great
importance, and that has not yet been fully embraced
by computer science, regulatory economists, or the
law. This work will be important to business school
graduates, of course, and to society. It will provide
decades of research opportunities, increase enrollments for our course, and provide great value to our
school’s graduates, to business, and to society. It will
exploit an area where MIS faculty have an advantage
over computer science researchers on the one hand
and economists on the other, in that we combine both
an intuitive understand of the role of information and
an equally intuitive understanding of information economics. Additionally, the high degree of relevance,
even urgency, of the research will provide greater visibility for the profession and its professional societies.
The work initially generated by this study will
need to address the following questions:
• How might technology, information access, and
information-based businesses affect society? Which
segments of society might benefit disproportionately and which segments might be harmed?
• What social policies might minimize harm and
which social policies might be preferred?
• What regulatory policies might be considered to
implement those social policies?
• As importantly, it will seek to address when regulation might be unnecessary, because the necessary is-

sues will be addressed by society and by informed
consumers.
The work is interdisciplinary, and the underlying
disciplines include information systems economics,
social impact, law and regulatory policy, and anthropology and ethnography. Its methodology will be
similarly interdisciplinary, requiring economic modeling, computer simulation, focus groups and surveys,
scenario analysis, big data analytics, history of science
and technology, legal history, and regulatory policy.
2.

Social Context

As we know, modern information technology is dramatically changing business, economics, and society.
In aggregate and on average, these changes are beneficial. However, the benefits of technology, and of each
of its applications, are distributed unevenly. As with
any disruption, there are be winners and losers.
As with previous technologies associated with
mass production of textiles and heavy industry, there
has been both the great creation of wealth, and the
creation of unemployed or under-employed workers.
Recent technological innovations have already exacerbated income inequality [46], in part due to the winner-take-all [30] aspects of many innovative apps and
online business models [6, 31]. There may be additional unforeseen impacts, where wealth disparity and
income inequality are exacerbated further, and although society benefits as a whole, some sectors of the
labor market and some segments of the economy are
significantly worse off, perhaps for extended periods
of time.
There may be unforeseen risks associated with the
winner take all nature of some businesses, due to first
mover effects reinforced by economies of scale or
network effects, where the first established player may
have the power to eliminate competition and stifle
innovation.
There may be unforeseen risks associated with
firms that gain dominance in one industry or one market segment, and then use that power to dominate other areas, again potentially limiting competition and
stifling innovation [8, 10].
There may even be areas in which many users
gain, but other participants are harmed, with harm that
potentially outweighs the gains. Uber benefits riders
who can afford surge pricing, but harms the regulated
taxi industry; perhaps the solution is as simple as
regulating Uber or unregulating taxis. Airbnb benefits
both those with space to rent on a short-term basis and
those who want to obtain short-term housing, but its
implications for the broader communities around those
renting out their space are as yet unclear [5, 40].
At present we can frame far more questions than
we can answer.
• How would we know how to design our policies?
More specifically, how would we define the greatest good that could be produced by a transformative innovation and how would we know Page
if it had
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been achieved?
• How would we regulate these emerging businesses
to achieve the greatest good? How would we
measure policy improvement? What is the need
for policy improvement? What regulations will
yield improvement?
• Wow would we regulate to ensure that while trying
to help we did not increase harm or limit the benefits from innovation? This could happen through
premature or inappropriate regulation, that reduced
competition or stifled innovation?
3.

Methodological Framework

This research will need to draws its theoretical
foundations from the history of technological innovation, the history of business strategy, information economics, and regulatory economics.
Methodologically, it will embrace the broadest set
of disciplines available to MIS researchers working in
information systems economics. It will use ethnographic observation, surveys, focus groups, scenario
analysis, economic modeling, and computer simulation to develop and test hypotheses. Each of these is
necessary, for different reasons, allowing for strongly
complementary interactions among them.
Ethnographic observation, surveys, and focus
groups are necessary in order to understand what
members of society know, what they believe, and how
they will act to changes. This is essential in designing
appropriate policy. It is now clear that public education is not sufficient to persuade young adults not to
smoke, or not to drink before driving. The policy
banning sale of alcohol and tobacco to young adults
would not be necessary if young adults “selfregulated” their consumption of these products.
Which online behaviors will be self-regulating? How
would we know? What sort of abuses by powerful
software firms will be rectified by increased transparency and by public outrage and market response, and
which will not? Most importantly, how would we
know? How would we perform research in this area
in order to determine when transparency and informing the public is sufficient, and when additional interventions might be required? Although there have
been a few papers on reasoning from small samples or
the use of ethnographic observation, this has not been
a core discipline in MIS research information systems
economics and strategy [3, 24, 36, 37]
Scenario Analysis is a form of structured exploration, used to examine the wide range of actions possible in uncertain situations, and the wide range of
outcomes that might be produced [49, 53, 54].
Economic modeling is the most common mechanism for judging the impact of alternative regulatory
policies. It can continue to be used any time comparative statics are appropriate and equilibrium analysis is
possible. Since it is the principal focus of much of the
MIS strategy research community, and has been a
principal focus of WISE and HICSS as noted above,

and of the information systems economics and strategy publications of ISR, JMIS, and Management Science, no further references are required here.
Computer simulation is used when the complexity of economic problems is so complex, or when dynamic behavior and trajectories over time are needed,
since these make more traditional comparative statics
and equilibrium analysis less appropriate. MIT’s
Sloan School pioneered the use of Industrial Dynamics simulation as a tool for management planning and
analysis [29, 51]. A previous HICSS paper presents
an early use of computer simulation to explore the
regulatory policy implications of competition between
complex online platforms [18].
4.

Why should we care about these changes?

What, if anything, is new about competition online?
Clearly, the composition of the Fortune 50 has
changed dramatically over the past ten years, and
many of the largest companies today by market capitalization do not produce any physical products, do
not sell anything directly to consumers, and have no
competition of any kind, anywhere in the world. Why
should we care about how large these companies got,
or about how fast they got this large? Why should we
care that they introduced new business models, with
unanticipated social consequences? Why should we
anticipate any problems at all?
Free Services Subsidized Through Advertising: Many online businesses have business models
that we have never seen before. Some companies do
not charge their end users anything for services, and
have found a way to monetize targeted advertising
based on private and personal data extracted from users’ accounts. Others have developed spectacularly
profitable platform services, and have used the profits
from these services to subsidize additional businesses;
with subsidies, these businesses operate at price points
that no independent competitor can match. And are
these business models fundamentally different from
prior business models? Why should free services, or
services subsidized by earnings on other services, create problems?
First Mover Effects and Positive Externalities:
We’ve seen economies of scale before, and we’ve
seen network effects before. Why should first mover
effects, defended by economies of scale, be a greater
threat to competition now than previously, and why
should it require any change in competition law now?
Think about the dominance of Windows after more
than three decades of progress in software and in
technology generally. Why should first mover effects,
defended by the value of large networks of users, be a
greater threat to competition now, and why should it
require any change in competition law now? Think
about what it would take to displace Facebook, which
has the largest user base of any social network in the
world.
Combining Positive Externalities and Page
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tising: Now combine free services subsidized through
advertising combined with network effects. Again,
consider Facebook, which is the largest social network
in the world and which already appears to be free to
its users. How is this different from earlier subsidized
television and radio networks? How could a competitor to Facebook emerge? Why would a user join any
other social network, since it would start off much
smaller and thus less valuable, and its price could not
be lower than free?
Targeted Advertising: Does targeted advertising create problems that traditional advertising does
not [9, 48]? Why should targeted advertising be any
different from blanket shotgun broadcast advertising?
Does it matter if ads target children? Does it matter if
ads appear to come from friends? Does it matter if
social networks pay members to authorize the network
to send ads to these members’ friends, where the content is actually provided by the network and optimized
to produce the strongest possible response among recipients?
Bundling and Platform Envelopment. Why
should value-adding strategies based on bundling as
many services as possible be any different from oneshop stopping at a really good super-market, megamarket, or hypermarché? Yes, platform operators
have enormous power to determine what is placed on
their devices and where it is place [8, 10]. Google’s
Mobile Services Distribution Agreement allows it to
determine which apps must be placed on its manufacturers’ devices and where these apps must be placed,
and which apps cannot be placed on their devices.
Yes, this gives Google the ability to promote its own
offerings and the ability to crush competitors. But,
again, how is this different from the power of giant
retailers such as Wal-Mart or Tesco?
5.

Is there a need for policy and for a regulatory
response?

Why should we believe that a coherent new social
policy is going to be required, and why should we
believe that we have not had sufficient time to develop
such policy? And why do we believe that there are
going to be unique regulatory problems, requiring
unique solutions and why should we believe that we
have not had sufficient time to develop appropriate
solutions?
There are historical precedents for social disruption and social problems in the presence of extreme
change, even in the absence of such extreme speed.
And with this speed, the prospects for regulation by
trial and error are not promising. With AT&T it took
decades of trial and error to design the right regulatory
regime [42, 55].
Initially it was thought that AT&T could be regulated as a form of interstate commerce. The ICC was
effective in regulating rail traffic, but was not suited
for regulating telecommunications. Rail networks
were different, with different sources of power, differ-

ent sources of competition, and different issues in interconnectivity and interoperability. Consequently,
the ICC was not the right regulatory framework for
telecoms. The Sherman Antitrust Act worked to ensure competition in heaving industries like steel, coal,
oil refining and distribution, and other industries
where there was no compelling need for interoperability across company boundaries, but was not the right
model for telecoms. The nation’s ability to obtain the
products of heavy industry were not limited by dividing companies to reduce monopoly power; with the
technologies of the late 1800s and early 1900s breaking up AT&T would have limited the ability of telephone users to call each other. The Kingsbury Commitment worked well for almost two decades when
AT&T was solely in the wire-line communications
industries. However, when its domination of long
lines traffic allowed AT&T to threaten vertical integration and threaten to dominate the emerging broadcast radio network industry, then a new regulatory
framework needed to be considered.
The ICC, the Sherman Act, and the Kingsbury
Commitment all proved less than entirely effective in
regulating AT&T and emerging radio and television
network broadcasting. Not all large firms are the
same. Not all forms of interstate commerce are the
same. Not all sources of first mover advantage are the
same. Standardization easily created interoperability
in rail traffic, but not in telecoms. It was impossible
for railroads to vertically integrate into meat packing
and gain an advantage over other meat packers, but
easy for AT&T to vertically integrate into broadcast
radio and cripple competition. Creation of the FCC
was the result of decades of trial and error, before an
appropriate regulatory structure was understood.
Even one or two examples should be sufficient to
illustrate how ill-prepared we may be for some the
changes that might emerge from today’s new technologies and new business models.
5.1. Real-Time Pricing, Reallocation of Scarce Resources, and Society’s Perceptions of Fairness
Uber has introduced a form of price efficiency that has
led to allocative efficiency. With surge pricing, those
of us who most want cars are allocated them because
we are willing to pay more to get a car quickly; likewise, with surge pricing drivers who might not be
willing to drive for lower payments are tempted to
join the pool of drivers at peak times. With Uber, we
all have an opportunity to pay what we are willing to
pay for transportation. If we are not in a hurry, a
shared Uber X is the cheapest way to travel. If we
want a car immediately, during a snowstorm or during
normal rush hour, we can get an Uber Black car
quickly, even when taxis are not available; however,
we will pay significantly higher prices. Economists
love the efficiency this creates, but society may want
to ask when this form of spot market differential pricing is not acceptable. Is it ok for hotel roomsPage
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charge different prices at different times of year, or
during special events, or even based on whether the
guest is a business traveler or a vacation traveler?
Most of us would agree that it is. Is it acceptable for
scarce organ transplants to be allocated to the highest
bidder? Most of society would agree that it is not.
Are there forms of price efficiency that are less clear
cut, like allowing an airline to charge fees based on
how desperately we need to travel, or like allowing
insurance companies to charge prices for coverage
that are closely tied to data mining, privacy violations,
and deep profiling of individuals based on financial
risk, health, or other factors? What if some of these
factors are closely correlated with race? As a society
we are less clear about the fairness of some forms of
differential pricing than we are about others. We have
not had time as a society to develop an informed consensus on how we feel about delegating the authority
to collect that much information by for-profit firms,
for the use by a host of other for-profit firms, when the
information can be used to charge some citizens very
different prices from those paid by others. However,
if these practices can be performed without public
visibility, and if they confer competitive advantage on
the firms that do them best, market forces alone are
unlikely to implement preferred public policies.
5.2. Business Models for the Sharing Economy,
Externalities, and Society’s View of Fairness
Without platforms such as Airbnb the sharing economy would be impossible. These platforms are new
enough that society has not had sufficient experience
to balance costs and benefits, or to balance risks and
rewards. Airbnb provides clear benefits both to people who want to earn a little extra money by offering
their homes as accommodations to renters, and to
short term renters who want to obtain housing but
don't want to stay in traditional hotels. And yet, Singapore is concerned that short term rentals “off the
grid” might be very convenient for terrorists and almost impossible to trace. Other cities are concerned
that long-term tenants might be forced out of their
apartments and entire regions of the city might become de facto hotels, reducing the available residential housing market while providing unfair competition to existing hotels [7, 22, 23]. Other cities are
concerned that mixing short term renters with long
term residents might significantly alter the character
of their cities. How should these concerns be balanced? What obligation does Airbnb have to measure
the impact of these externalities on the quality of life
in the markets they serve? What obligations if any
does Airbnb have to address potential negative impacts? Again, as a society we have not had time to
develop a policy on the externalities of these sharing
economy platforms. However, it has been known for
centuries that markets alone do not address the problems created by externalities; by definition, they are
outside the scope of market forces. Once again, if the

practices that result in harm through externalities are
not mitigated or controlled by markets, then market
forces alone are unlikely to implement preferred public policies.
6.

Why do we believe that some regulatory action
may be required?

We believe that although regulation of technology has
evolved significantly over the past century, it is still
heavily focused on the problems created by massive
industrialization of the late 1880s. Regulation of giant
manufacturers and other forms of heavy industry may
provide little guidance for the regulation of today’s
online businesses. Regulation of externalities from
pollution may have little to tell us about the externalities of the sharing economy. Regulation of meat packing and even of tobacco may have little to tell us about
the dangers of online services. Search warrants and
legal protection of even traditional electronic communications may not be adequate for data stored in the
cloud [13].
For a variety of reasons, we believe that many of
the issues raised in section 4 do indeed have the potential to create significant harm. Moreover, we believe
that these problems may not be fully addressed by
existing laws and regulations. First, some platforms
have created new forms of externalities, benefiting
participants in the platforms but harming others in the
community who have no interactions with the platforms and indeed might not benefit from interacting
with the platforms. We have had decades to learn to
deal with some forms of externalities, like physical
pollution caused by agriculture or heavy industry;
often, despite decades of experience our regulations
are still unclear or ineffective. New platforms, with
externalities that are difficult to detect, assess, or
measure accurately, are certain to produce new regulatory conflicts. Additionally, as we have seen, there
are new tradeoffs among price efficiency, allocative
efficiency, and a real but poorly understood and illdefined sense of social fairness.
As importantly, we believe that in the absence of
laws and regulations markets alone will not solve these newly emerging problems. This is true even if
some countries impose regulations, while others do
not [11].
6.1. New externalities may create new challenges
Historically, altruism has not been sufficient to correct
all problems caused by externalities. Consider the
harm caused down-wind by the widespread burning of
Indonesian forests. Closer to home, consider the harm
caused by toxic dumping or by the burning of high
sulfur coal. When the economic benefits of one actor
are great enough, harm to other parties are systematically discounted or ignored. Indeed, this has been the
origin of zoning policies and environmental laws and
regulations around the world. The markets may “endorse” things that are good for buyers and sellers,
Page but
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not for the broader public. Economists have known
for centuries that markets do not fully encompass the
impacts of externalities and do not price externalities
into the costs of goods and services. This is one of the
principal reasons why we have regulations. Indeed, it
is even possible that the markets may endorse things
that are not even good for the buyers, but without their
knowing it. The widespread adoption of cigarettes,
for example, and the need to regulate cigarette advertising, alcohol advertising, and the sale of tobacco and
alcohol to minors are all examples where society has
decided that the costs of uninformed decisions by
some are too high. Society has decided that the costs
are too high, and even the individual decision makers
may need to be protected from the downsides of their
own decisions. This is a second reason for regulations. Finally, we may need more regulations when
the natural advantages of a first mover are so great
that they may make competition impossible [14].
6.2. MP3PP Power, Including Monopoly Pricing
and Cross Subsidies and Vertical Integration:
MP3PPs do not look like monopolies, and yet they
often enjoy monopoly power. MP3PPs are able to use
their monopoly profits to provide numerous free
goods and services, which initially appear to benefit
consumers. However, since these destroy even the
possibility of competition, they may ultimately lead to
future harm. And yet both are outside the historical
scope of competition law, in the US and abroad [8, 10,
14, 18].
6.3. Systematic Privacy Violations for Differential
Pricing and for Targeted Ads
Nothing in existing regulation appears to deal with the
delayed and hidden harm from privacy violations.
Our online activities allow service providers to create
a detailed and accurate profile of our preferences, our
habits, our desires, our willingness to pay for goods
and services, the risks we face, and the costs to serve
us. The current benefits from our activities are clear
now [48]. The future downsides are both uncertain
and not visible to us now. Nothing in existing regulation appears to address the reallocation of resources
due to the potential of market pricing of everything.
As a society, we have discussed the role of differential
pricing in markets like air travel and credit card fees,
which do appear not to be problematic. We do not
know how we would react to the instant individualized
market pricing of everything from transportation to
medical care.
Historically, people have not been able to make
fully informed decisions in their own self-interest,
when the benefits of an action are immediate, certain,
and visible, but the harm is delayed, uncertain, and not
yet visible. Everyone knows that cigarettes are harmful, and many people know that obesity is associated
with cardiovascular disease, higher risk of stroke, and
type 2 (non-genetic) diabetes. And yet, people smoke

and consume vast amounts of sugar-laden soft drinks
and fatty fried snacks.
There is at present ample evidence that people are
unaware of the long-term costs associated with the
immediate benefits from using online software that
employs deep data mining, employs in-depth profiling, and uses this information for targeted marketing.
There is ample evidence that they are either unaware
of the costs or systematically underestimate the costs.
As a society we have decided to limit the sale of
cigarettes to minors, to make cigarette smoking more
difficult and more expensive for adults, and to take
assorted other regulatory actions to help people improve their own health. Do we need to consider protecting the online privacy of minors? Do we need to
consider the online privacy of everyone, to the extent
that data mining and deep profiling may affect the
prices we all pay for goods and services in the future?
6.4. Search Bias and the Manipulation of Public
Opinion
Nothing in existing regulation appears to address the
problems of intentional search bias and the potential
for manipulation of public opinion. Recent studies
have demonstrated the search engine bias can be used
to manipulate public opinion before elections and referenda [25, 26]. There is no Federal Search Commission to ensure fairness, much the way the Federal
Communications used to ensure fairness when there
was a small number of TV stations and bias could
indeed affect the electorate’s access to information.
With search now far more concentrated than media,
and with search bias much harder to detect than media
bias, is it necessary to enforce some form of fairness
in search? How could that be defined or implemented
[4]?
6.5. Fake News and the Future of Democracies
Nothing in existing regulation appears to address the
problems associated with the ease of disseminating
fake news. First Amendment rights allow all of us to
say whatever we want, subject to a few restrictions
like not advocating violent overthrow of the elected
government. But fake news on social media can reach
millions of viewers very quickly; fake news is inherently different from one-on-one private speech, or
even speaking on a soap box on Speakers Corner in
Hyde Park, London. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
by the end of the 2016 elections in November, fake
news stories were being shared online with frequency
equaling or even exceeding that of fact-checked mainstream media. Moreover, a fake news story may be
shared hundreds of thousands or millions of times,
while its retraction or refutation may be shared only
thousands of times. The impact of fake news on the
Brexit Referendum is becoming clear [32, 50]. The
impact of fake news on the American election of 2016
may never be entirely clear [27, 45]. Moreover, fake
news is emerging as a potential issue in upcoming
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elections throughout the EU, and it is becoming clear
that increasingly citizens choose what to believe from
numerous alternatives on offer online, and are less and
less influenced by facts [35]. Websites like Facebook
are seen as increasingly culpable [28], and are attempting to police themselves [44], but this is proving
difficult to accomplish.
If a regulatory response is required for any of these issues, it may be essential that the response be rapid. Unprecedented speed of analysis, debate, and response may be required. New companies and new
industries are emerging at unprecedented speeds. If
regulatory decisions are required, delays of decades
may result in truly unacceptable individual and social
costs, and may result in irreparable harm. It may also
result in the entrenchment of special interests that it
would be almost impossible to displace.
It is however possible that no action is required.
There may not actually be any problems that require
regulatory intervention. First and foremost, no regulatory action would be required if there is no harm that
requires redressing. This requires modeling and the
sort of analysis described above. Moreover, no regulatory action would be required if whatever harm
might occur were certain to be self-rectifying. That is,
no regulatory intervention would be required if it were
certain that any problems that might arise in a specific
area or through a specific business model could be
corrected by normal market forces. This requires the
sort of methodological approaches described in the
following section.
7.

Methodologies — How would we know if the
market will self-correct all abuses?

If normal market forces will be sufficient to correct any negative impacts from emerging technologies
and new business models, this would render regulation
superfluous. Academic research should focus on the
following questions, among others that will emerge as
the community’s research progresses.
7.1. How will society handle fairness or perceived
changes in fairness resulting from new forms
of price efficiency and price discrimination?
Market efficiency has benefits of course; for example,
in insurance, low risk individuals are charged less,
increasing the likelihood that they purchase insurance.
Since low risk individuals still have some risk, properly priced insurance is beneficial to them. Market efficiency also produces harm. High risk individuals are
charged more, and may be unable to afford coverage.
Efficient pricing in medical insurance is becoming
even more pressing. Ever increasing levels of information endowment will allow an increasing number of
service providers to implement efficient pricing, basing prices on customers’ individual willingness to pay
for services, need for those services, cost to provide
those services, or other factors that affect expected
profitability. When and where will this become is-

sues of social concern, and when and where will this
require well-formulated social policy and regulatory
responses? The raging debates over health care in the
US today are proof that our society has not yet figured
out how to deal with informed markets and the resulting price efficiency that results. What are other areas
where price efficiency and price discrimination will
become significant social concerns? We have learned
to accept price discrimination and price efficiency in
air travel and in financial services. Where else will
price discrimination emerge? How will society respond? How should society respond? These questions remain important and they remain unanswered.
7.2. How will society handle fairness or perceived
changes in fairness resulting from new forms
of price efficiency and allocative efficiency?
Most of us have come to accept that business travelers
are charged more for flights, and that they are more
likely to receive upgrades when they fly and to receive
room upgrades when they check into their hotels.
Most of us are coming to accept that those of us who
really want to travel around town use Uber despite
surge pricing, book limousines for their trips in advance, or even book a car and a driver for the day, if
we can afford it. And yet our acceptance of surge
pricing seems to be at best conditional on their being
no acute need for it! Consider the recent international
outrage when Uber’s surge pricing was automatically
invoked in response to an urgent need for cars to leave
the area of London Bridge after suicide attacks involving a van mowing down pedestrians [1, 33, 52]. How
would we feel if differential pricing allowed food delivery services to charge different prices depending
upon how hungry they thought we were, or if airlines
began to charge differential prices depending on how
urgently we needed to travel?
7.3. How will society handle the near monopoly
power that accrues to operators of online
gateways and mandatory participation third
party payer systems?
Online retailers like Amazon can develop market
share and reputation beyond that of any individual
traditional retailer. Online agencies like hotels.com
can develop market share and reputation greater than
any traditional competitor. Apple has been found
guilty of abusing market power in electronic books
distribution [47]. Most anti-monopoly law today
deals with controlling the power of giant physical
manufacturers and transportation companies; that is, it
deals with the industries that dominated the late 19th
and mid 20th centuries. Do we need to update antimonopoly law to deal with the giant online retailers
that are emerging in the early 21st centuries? We had
originally expected online entry to be so easy that no
dominant powers would emerge, but this does not
appear to be the case. Does the power of an Amazon,
or an Orbitz, or the Apple App Store, benefitPage
or harm
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consumers? If indeed regulation is necessary, do we
need to harmonize regulation across the major economies? Does regulation in North America, the EU,
China, Japan, and Korea need to be coordinated, or
should each nation develop its own policy?
Similarly, online gateways like Google operate as
if they were parallel monopolies. Most users singlehome; that is, most buyers do not search for their purchases on two or more search engines. As a result,
sellers are required to participate in most or even all
search engines in order to ensure that they are found
by all buyers. Choice may indeed be just a click away
for buyers, but as long as buyers still search with either Google or Bing, sellers must be present on both
Google and Bing. That gives both Google and Bing
monopoly market share over their own users, and thus
gives both Google and Bing extraordinary pricing
power in the sale of keywords.
7.4. How will society respond to platform envelopment, when firms use their profits from dominant platforms to create new monopolies?
How will society respond when firms use their power
over gateways or the profits from MP3PP system to
provide cross subsidies, develop a suite of applications, and engage in platform envelopment strategies?
Will these platform envelopment strategies be deemed
anti-competitive, and the abusive use of nearmonopoly power, as Microsoft’s expansion beyond
Windows and its Office Suite were? Will they be
given tacit approval even in the case of greater power,
as has occurred to date with dominant search engine
providers in most locations around the world?
We don’t know, and we need do know.
7.5. And how would we know what response or
responses are appropriate?
How would we know if the market could correct problems directly affecting users? There is a range of research methodologies that would be appropriate for an
agenda as broad as ours. We address each of the issues we raised previously and describe the methodologies that would be appropriate. Several research
methodologies will certainly need to be combined.
We will need to work with legal scholars and
economic historians to understand the social and economic problems that technology has engendered in the
past and how legal codes and regulatory environments
where shaped to address them.
We will need economic modeling, including dynamic economic and behavioral simulations, to understand the complexity of competitive behavior and of
consumer behavior under a wide range of conditions.
How will firms compete under various conditions?
What will market structure emerge under each — monopoly, duopoly, or effective competition? How will
these be altered by consumer awareness of the behavior of firms? Under what conditions and regulatory
regimes can markets properly address.

We will need anthropological insights, ethnographic observation, and surveys to determine the
extent to which transparency and consumer awareness
can address problems. For example, surveys might
tell us if consumers are aware of externalities and
aware of the extent to which their actions harm others
or themselves. Additionally, surveys might tell us that
consumers would care, if they knew the harm that
their actions caused. It would appear that consumers
are aware of the problems caused by smoking, texting
while driving, or the excess consumption of sugars
and fatty foods; it is also clear from public health
problems and traffic fatalities that awareness alone has
not eliminated these problems. What lessons, if any,
can we learn to guide the policy and regulations in the
domain of technology and society?
Finally, we need to ask how society can address
all of the complex issues and the interactions among
them, and whether it can determine an appropriate
regulatory regime quickly enough to prevent harm to
consumers and to protect competition. That is, will it
decide before firms become so dominant, and so diversified, that regulatory responses are far more complex than they would be if we acted now, before harm
occurred and before newly dominant players were
firmly entrenched globally.
8.

In Conclusion

Our research community in information systems economics now faces a great challenge. Much of the
work that we now do at the intersection of modeling
and information-based strategy is also being done at
the innovative firms that have implemented the most
aggressive information-based strategies. When compared to the resources available to academic researchers, these firms have virtually unlimited resources and
virtually unlimited access both to superbly trained
personnel and to the information that their firms generate and need to study. We will be surpassed.
The broader MIS community has faced similar
challenges before, when corporate research in the development and modeling of database management
outran academic research in the area. Database development organizations like IBM and Oracle had unlimited resources for modeling database management
systems, constructing them, and studying their actual
performance. We persevered as a community and
found new areas for our research, including a focus on
implementation, adoption, and technology management and on information-based strategy.
Our community will persevere again.
9.
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